

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 4, Folder 9

August 14, 1952 -
November 14, 1952

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August 14, 1952

Dear Tichenor:

If you will remember in the write-up in SOWESPAC, which, by the way, is about to go to press, the following statement from you was quoted:

"...the more tons sunk, the higher the award. Naturally, submarine commanding officers did not generally view with favor those assignments which tended to remove them from the anti-shipping field. In this they were often supported by the division, squadron and force commanders, who believed that the correct employment of submarines was against merchant shipping, and not in direct support of fleet operations."

I sent the book to Admiral E.E. Yeomans who was the planning officer for Admiral Nimitz, who, whereas he agreed in general with the remarks made throughout SOWESPAC and POA submarine operations, stated as follows:

"...I do concur in the soundness of some criticism as to the stationing of submarines during the Leyte Gulf campaign as discussed in your analysis. I do not go along completely with the gist of Murray Tichenor's statement as you have it worded on page 94U. It is true that the principal yard stick for awards to submarine Commanding Officers and their officers and crew members was "ships sunk and damaged". What finer general yard stick could there be for any combat type of ship in time of war?! The basis of awards, however, was by no means limited to merchant ships and in fact was broad enough to fully recognize appropriate acts in support of surface ships operations. Sinking combat types including enemy submarines was a prize accomplishment with great emphasis placed upon the amount of opposition encountered. Reconnaissance missions and many tasks performed by submarines well in advance of and in support of the Third and Fifth Fleet major operations were in fact given appropriate recognition in declaring patrols successful and making awards."

Have you any other comment to make with relation to your comment? Frankly, most submarine commanders who have read this with the exception of Admiral Yeomans have agreed that your comment was in general correct. However, under your comment I am contemplating quoting Yeomans with this comment - "Perhaps the concept in POA was somewhat different from that in SOWESPAC."

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral Murray J. Tichenor, USN(Ret),
P.O. Box 306,
Millville, New Jersey.

August 20, 1952

Dear Admiral Tichenor:

You say you were surprised upon receiving, as you call it, the "purported quote" on SOWESPAC submarine operations. If this is so, my surprise was infinitely greater for the quotation was most definitely yours. You might well have forgotten it "since the strongest memory is weaker than the palest ink", but where could I have obtained the idea? The ideas expressed were from you as you were the only submarine officer of consequence in SOWESPAC with whom I discussed these submarine operations at the time that I wrote them up. It was you who pointed out that it was not only the submarine commanding officers, but division, squadron and force commanders as well who believed that the correct employment of submarines was against merchant shipping. Since receiving your letter I spoke to a submarine commander (SUBPAC) in the War College and he said that he concurred with the remarks in the book, that there was considerable beefing among submarine commanders when they were assigned assignments which they considered would be unproductive, and further that there was much of this in SOWESPAC. It wasn't the idea of the medal so much as the idea of a successful patrol which motivated the submarine commanders.

However, since you feel "on the hook" I have taken you off it as the enclosed pages show. In this connection there were only two or three places in this whole submarine write-up where you recommended changes in the book. The above was one of them. If you will remember, you complimented me on the write-up and stated that it was surprisingly correct. I was as pleased as you appeared to be about it.

I am "on the hook" all of the time, but I feel that I could not do this job properly if I endeavored to please anyone. Let the facts speak!

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Encl: BFLG Pages 94U & 94U(2)

Rear Admiral Murray J. Tichenor, USN(Ret),
P.O. Box 306,
Millville, N.J.

1140

August 27, 1952

Dear Mr. Blair:

In looking over this command structure, it is difficult, as I said before, to clearly define and delineate certain Japanese command relations.

We do know as follows:

- (a) That Vice Admiral Mikawa was Commander Outer South Seas Forces and Commander EIGHTH Fleet on August 7th.
- (b) On the afternoon of August 7th he was relieved by Vice Admiral Nishio Tsukahara as Commander Outer South Seas Force and of the operational command of the EIGHTH Fleet. Vice Admiral Mikawa then became Commander Cruiser Force.

I think that for the sake of our diagram it is merely necessary originally to show Mikawa at Rabaul and Tsukahara at Tinian. Then you may show on your diagram the movement of Tsukahara to Rabaul and the pushing out of Mikawa to the cruiser command as Commander Cruiser Force.

The command diagram shown on Plate I is correct. If you feel it helpful to put in that on August 8th Vice Admiral Tsukahara became Commander South East Area Force and as such commanded Outer South Seas Force and the Base Air Force, you may do so, but since we do not know the limitations of the South East Area, it may be a little difficult to portray this.

I suggest the rewording of the Command Paragraph on page 5 of the script as follows:

"In order to obtain unity of command, in event of attack, Commander 11th Air Fleet at Tinian was authorized, if necessary, to assume command of the 4th, 6th, and 8th Fleets. After the Allied capture of Tulagi, Commander 11th Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Nishio Tsukahara was directed to relieve Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, the Commander Outer South Seas Force. He did so in the afternoon of August 7th. The latter assumed the responsibility for securing a victory with the surface forces available. There was no confusion in the Japanese command at the battle of Savo Island. All forces engaged were naval forces in a clearly defined chain of command."

Our meeting was very successful and I hope that you got something out of it.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair,
Film Graphics,
245 W. 55th Street,
New York, N.Y.

September 3, 1952

Dear Kirm:

This office is in receipt of a letter, signed by you, requesting that the Chief of Information be provided with two copies each of the Strategic and Tactical Analyses (CONFIDENTIAL) of the various major engagements of the Pacific campaign.

I have talked over your request with the President of the War College and it is on this account that I am writing you personally as a graduate of the War College. Very frankly these books are held in confidential status by the CNO because they contain certain tactical and strategical data, information concerning the conduct of operations by Allied commanders, and information concerning the mental processes of these commanders, which makes them very restricted in their use. They were designed for the education of high command; they were not designed for other officers or civilian use.

The War College has instructions that these books are to be distributed to a limited naval mailing address only.

Neither Admiral Conolly nor myself can see any possible use for these books in the Office of Public Information because of the above. As a matter of interest, what is this Historical section in the Office of Public Information which thinks it might like these books?

Finally, the War College would view with great concern any attempt by anyone in the Office of Public Information to employ these studies for publicity purposes which would not only violate security, but would be, of course, pure plagiarism.

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I am writing to you because, before we take a definite stand in this matter here, we would like to hear from you, since we feel that you understand the situation.

With best regards and hopes that you are finding your present assignment to your liking, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain L.J. Kirn, USN,
Office of Information,
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D.C.

September 10, 1952

Dear Captain Burke:

Thank you very much for your letter concerning GIBSON PNT2, USNR. He has acted on it and his request is probably in your hands. For your information, owing to difficulties here because of the excessive amount of work in my office and the shortage of yeomen, I have borrowed GIBSON temporarily from the Naval Base to help me out. It was for that reason that he communicated with me. Actually I seem to require three yeomen here, I have but two now and one is in the hospital. The one in the hospital is CAVANAUGH, Joseph W., 606 20 01, (YN-2522), YN2, USN.

If you will remember, CAVANAUGH was to have been sent to sea about now and has been making preparations to depart but so far he has received no orders. He is now in the hospital and it seems likely, according to the Medical Staff, that he will not be returned to duty. Therefore, it is urgent that I get a competent, intelligent, Yeoman Second Class to fill my allowance.

I have spoken to you often concerning the type of yeoman we should have here and your office has always arranged to choose the yeoman and to send him via FIRST Naval District. At the same time your office would also notify the FIRST Naval District that the yeoman was destined for the War College.

If you feel you cannot order CAVANAUGH's relief until you hear about CAVANAUGH's disposition, I suggest that you detach him now in view of the fact that he is due for sea. This will automatically create a vacancy here.

In this connection you will be interested to know that I am presently using four yeomen, two of whom are civilians borrowed from the War College to help me catch-up on my work which requires many hours of typing. I know that you understand my problem and therefore hope to hear from you very shortly.

With best regards and with regret that I have to trouble you with this matter, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain E.J. Burke, USN,
Room 2805, ARLINGTON ANNEX,
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Washington 25, D.C.

1145

September 23, 1952

Dear Captain Stickney:

As I had forecast to you and your staff long ago, since you handle its publication, Volume I of the Battle for Leyte Gulf study being prepared by the Naval War College has now been completed. It is now in the hands of the typists who are preparing it for publication through offset printing by the Government Printing Office. The book will not be brought to you for publication before sometime in November, but I am alerting you now so that you will be ready to handle it.

I want it put out in a manner similar to the Battle of Savo Island analysis, i.e., the book and diagrams to be in separate volumes.

I will be down in Washington presently and I will explain more fully what I am after, because the first job done by the Government Printing Office on Savo Island was so poor that it had to be returned and re-done. The War College, the VCNO and your office were very unhappy about it.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W. BATES.

Captain Fred R. Stickney, USN,
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Room 2635 ARLINGTON ANNEX,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

1146

October 21, 1952

Dear Casey:

I was in Washington a few weeks ago and dropped into your office to see you. You were not there. However I had no problems. I merely wished to say goodbye to you and to thank you for all the help you have given this section, and, need I say the War College as well, during your tenure of office as ACNO (Personnel).

I was informed at the time of my visit there that you would remain in office until about the first of November. I have had hopes to be down there before that time, but now I know that I will not be down until the middle of November at which time you will be gone. So here is best wishes for a happy cruise!

Since I last saw you a problem has arisen which I do not plan to discuss as yet, but on which you might give me some advice before you depart. It is the problem of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret) who has been advised that he would be returned to inactive duty at the end of March 1953. I realize the problem before the Department caused by the Davis Amendment and I am reluctant to deprive someone of promotion by retaining a retired officer on active duty. However, as you know, we are working hard on the Battle for Leyte Gulf and I have finished, as of now, the First Volume of this opus. There will be one or two more Volumes. We are now working on the Second Volume. I hope that, when you see the First Volume in the fleet, it will meet with your approval. It has been a tough assignment because of the vast number of ships and planes employed and because of the difficulty of obtaining all of the information.

However to return to Captain Rochefort. I had been advised that it would be well to get retired officers, but as you know I was somewhat dubious about that because of the strange ways of Congress and sometimes of the Navy. However, I did accept Captain Rochefort because, according to Felix Johnson, he was tip-top in Japanese intelligence, and because I understood that as Captain Rochefort would be doing "history work" he would not be touched. I have found him to be the best Japanese translator in Navy uniform I have ever seen. In addition he has a large grasp of the Japanese phases of Leyte Gulf since he has been working on them for over one year. Is this to be thrown away? Do you recommend

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that I do anything about this or let it drop for the present?
With the arrival of the new president there might well be a
change.

Once again let me thank you for everything you have done and
to assure you that you have made my most difficult assignment
somewhat easier.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral C.L. Green, USN,
ACNO (Personnel),
Room 4E522, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

October 21, 1952

Dear Casey:

I was in Washington a few weeks ago and dropped into your office to see you. You were not there. However I had no problems. I merely wished to say goodbye to you and to thank you for all the help you have given this section, and, need I say the War College as well, during your tenure of office as ACNO (Personnel).

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Once again let me thank you for everything you have done and
to assure you that you have made my most difficult assignment
somewhat easier.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral C.L. Green, USN,
ACNO (Personnel),
Room 4E522, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

October 22, 1952

Dear Don:

Admiral Conolly has now returned from the coast and has decided that you, of all people, are properly entitled to a certificate of graduation from the War College. He has, therefore, signed a Certificate for you. You will not get it, however, until the President of the War College can present it to you in a ceremonious manner when you come to the War College.

I am sorry that I will not be present at the cocktail party, but I know it will be swell.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral Harry D. Pelt, USN,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Room 4E568, Pentagon Building,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

1151

October 23, 1952

Dear Admiral Kinkaid:

I received your letter of the 20th instant with a great deal of pleasure as I well remember our associations in the Far Pacific during the latter years of World War II.

I am glad that you have seen the War College analyses of the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. We have completed one more study--that is, the Battle of Savo Island (1950). We have not made any studies of the battles to which you refer in your letter. As a matter of fact, although the Navy Department originally asked for studies of about ten battles, that number has, for the present, been reduced to four. These are: the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, Savo Island, and for Leyte Gulf. You are quite correct that my World War II Battle Evaluation Group is at present working on the latter battle. The study will probably cover three volumes since it is the study of a campaign rather than of a single small action. The first volume, which is entirely background, including the Battle off Formosa, has been completed. The second volume which commences with the capture of Suluan Island on October 17th, 1944 is now underway.

For your information, films have been made of the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, and a film is now being made of the Battle of Savo Island. These films have received universal approval.

It is very thoughtful of you to offer your assistance to the War College and should that assistance be required I shall not hesitate to call upon you. You are very kind

*Written By
Coms Bates*

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indeed to be willing to give up your time and I appreciate the offer. I have no doubt but that in the later volumes it will be necessary to bother you.

With warmest personal regards with which Commodore Bates joins, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.L. CONOLLY,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN(Ret),
2134 R Street, N.W.,
Washington 8, D.C.

October 27, 1952

Dear Henry:

It is very kind and thoughtful of you to handle the case of JONES YN2 which I referred to you. It wasn't vital and I left it to your discretion. Of course, I am glad to see that you were able to help him out.

A new case has arisen now in my own office. This is the case of GIBSON, Hoyt Sidney, 577 41 02, PNT2 (PN-2631-94), USNR. I wrote to Captain Burke about GIBSON sometime ago and pointed out that GIBSON was leaving the service in December, at which time he will have completed his obligated service. That means that he will be in the Navy less than two more months.

Today GIBSON found out to his surprise and, need I say, to my surprise that he had been made available to Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet for transfer and should be detached presently. With the approval of Captain Hederman I called Captain Burke today by telephone to see if he doesn't want GIBSON to remain here for these two months since to transfer him to sea for a matter of days seems very unwise. I telephoned Captain Burke because I feared that GIBSON might receive orders from CONSERVLANT at any moment.

Although GIBSON is attached to the Naval Station he has been loaned by special request to help me finish the First Volume of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, which should be completed in about one month.

Captain Burke understood the situation very readily and kindly agreed to give the situation a "look see." I hope that all will be well.

I'm writing this to you to parallel my discussion with the good Captain.

Thanks for everything. With very best regards, I am

Your old friend,

Captain Henry L. Naff, USN,
Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Room 2805, Arlington Annex,
Arlington, Virginia.

R.W. BATES.

1154

November 13, 1952

Dear Don:

I received your letter today with reference to Koyanagi's article on Leyte Gulf. Since you are in haste I will reply to you now concerning that article and in a day or so concerning Heffernan's article on Midway.

First I want to say that since in studying this battle I do not go beyond the day on which I am working and as I have not as yet reached the day of the battle (the 23rd, 24th and 25th) I am a little weak on what happened. However, Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret) on my staff has studied the Japanese side and with his help I have arrived at the following opinions:

(a) The article was not written for me or for the Naval War College. It is definitely an independent article, probably written at the instigation of Captain Ohmae or Mr. Roger Pineau, on duty in Heffernan's office where he is working for Sam Morison. I have been asking for information of this nature based on reports made at the time, but to date have received little or nothing. Articles of this kind written eight years later are useful but only when corroborated by evidence made at the time.

(b) It appears to be an effort on the part of Koyanagi to build up a justification for Kurita's decision on October 25th to abandon the penetration of Leyte Gulf. In this connection Koyanagi's statement that Kurita estimated there would be no transports left in the Gulf does not jibe with the facts given in the Japanese documents. Kurita received a report from the Mogami search plane dated October 24th wherein the pilot reported eighty transports in the Gulf.

There are numerous other inaccuracies based on the documents at the time. As an example of these, Koyanagi states (1) That the submarine attack in Palawan Passage was a complete surprise. This is not so since the FIRST Striking Force had received radio transmission of strength FIVE (very strong) from submarines and had alerted the command at 0419 to this effect two hours before the attack which sunk the ATAGO and MAYA. (2) That shipbased seaplanes had been transferred so

that there were no air-reconnaissance seaplanes available for antisubmarine patrol. This is not so. These planes were still on board the battleships and cruisers and were employed on a morning patrol flight after the submarine attack had occurred. (3) That nothing was heard from Ozawa's Mobile Fleet which was supposed to be maneuvering northeast of Luzon. This is not so since Commander Mobile Force's dispatch 1138 of October 24th, which was obtained from the FIRST Striking Force report, stated that he was launching an air attack against the enemy's Main Body in position 18-50 N, 124-10 E. This was very close to Admiral Halsey's position. (4) That the temporary westward retreat put them six hours behind schedule. This is not so since as they turned west at 1530 and turned east at 1715 they actually lost about 3½ hours behind schedule. (5) That news never reached them that Ozawa's Fleet had succeeded in luring Halsey northward on the morning of the 25th. It is of interest that on the morning of the 25th at 0815 Commander Mobile Force sent out a battle report that he was being engaged by eighty shipboard planes in position 19-10 N, 126-30 E. As this was a general battle message it seems logical to assume that it was received by FIRST Striking Force. Where did Koyanagi imagine these planes had come from?

There are many other inaccuracies in this article which are natural when one considers (a) the years that have elapsed since the battle and (b) the probable fact that the Japanese do not have the action report of the ships. We have most of them in the National Archives. These I have had translated.

Finally, it has been my opinion that articles of this kind are of interest and therefore it would not be unwise to publish this very confused article providing there is (a) a very definite caution as an introductory remark by the Naval Institute that this story of Vice Admiral Koyanagi is his own story written eight years after the action, (b) that his comments and the numerous inaccuracies of fact contained therein do not necessarily tell the true story of the action although they may seem true to Admiral Koyanagi today, (c) that the Naval Institute does not necessarily agree with the article and is only publishing it for the purpose of presenting a Japanese viewpoint.

I hope this answers your query.

With very best regards, I am,

Your old friend,

R.W. BATES.

Rear Admiral H.D. Felt, USN,
Office of the CNO (Op-30),
Room 4E566, Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

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November 14, 1952

Dear Don:

I am now replying to your request concerning Admiral Heffernan's article on Midway. But, before I tackle the Midway problem I wish to say, with reference to my letter of yesterday on Koyanagi's article, that it might be well, if you decide to publish that article, to have a comment on it in the same issue. I have spoken to Admiral Conolly about this and he agrees with me that it might be well to ask Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN(Ret), a Japanese language officer on my staff, to draw up a factual comment based on the Japanese documents available to us. I have spoken to Captain Rochefort and he is willing to do this if you desire him to do so. Normally we do not approve of this in the War College, but seeing you are a former Chief of Staff we want to help in every way we can.

To return to Admiral Heffernan's article. This article, of course, is purely speculative and makes interesting reading, but it is not necessarily sound. The Japanese plan called for the capture of Midway and Kiska in order to establish a barrier patrol to prevent strikes against Japan. This accounted, in part, for the movement into the Aleutians. Admiral Yamamoto would have liked to have had a fleet action at the time of seizure, but he didn't expect this to happen. Instead, he expected that public opinion would force the U.S. Navy to attempt later to recapture Midway but before the American Navy was fully ready. He also believed that there were no American surface forces with carriers as a nucleus off Midway.

This concept, that there were to be no carriers off Midway, was a serious error. However, in his defense it must be pointed out that the Japanese believed that they had sunk two American carriers in the Coral Sea battle and since they had observed Admiral Halsey's carriers in the South Pacific on May 14th, they felt that only limited surface forces could oppose them. Although they believed

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that there were two to three carriers in the Hawaiian area they did not expect to encounter them off Midway. They did not realize that we had sources of information so exact that we could pinpoint their strategy. However, it must be remembered that they did launch a search for Allied surface forces at the same time that they attacked Midway and held eighty-one planes in readiness to attack such surface forces if discovered. Unfortunately, they did not give this search the attention it deserved. In fact, they repudiated the search before its completion. As a consequence they got themselves in a jam which caused the loss of all four carriers.

I cannot agree with Heffernan's thesis except ⁱⁿ this-- had Admiral Yamamoto brought the whole Combined Fleet with all of its carriers to the Midway action and deployed them correctly he might well have done better and might have won the battle, particularly so had he discovered the American carriers before they discovered him and been prepared to capitalize upon his discovery. But since (a) he did not expect to meet any carriers, (b) he knew that Midway had about 109 planes of which two squadrons were patrol planes and (c) he had 234 planes in his four carriers, he felt that, based on both superiority and economy of force, he had ample forces present.

I cannot agree that it would have been wiser to send the four KONGO's to shell Midway. These were Japan's four fastest battleships, making possibly thirty knots, and they were required with the four carriers which made about thirty knots. Most of the other Japanese carriers made about twenty-six knots maximum. The MITSU, YAMATO and HAGATO could have replaced them, but since they were restricted to not over twenty-six knots, and generally less, this would have handicapped the fast carriers. Because of this factor alone, the loss of the four KONGO's would have been a disaster to the Japanese.

But for the sake of discussion let us assume that the plan went as Admiral Heffernan suggests and that we employed our carrier planes -- we are forgetting for the moment the American planes on Midway which might well have been effective -- to destroy the KONGO's and protect Midway. Would our carriers then have been vulnerable to Japanese carriers? Not necessarily so, since they would have had searches out and since they knew from previous searches that no Japanese surface forces other than the KONGO group were within 700 miles -- which is a full day's run at twenty-five knots. In my opinion Admiral Fletcher would have liked nothing

better than to have employed his carrier planes, in such a situation, against the KONGOs, since the KONGOs would have had no air cover. This would have tended to destroy the Japanese Navy piecemeal.

I also cannot agree that the Japanese carrier planes should not have been used against Midway. It would have been preferable perhaps to have launched them after a thorough search had been made, but, once again, it must be remembered that Yamamoto felt that his eight-one planes were more than ample for that.

Frankly, I don't agree with the Japanese handling of this action, but I do not concur with Admiral Heffernan's solution either. Whether or not you choose to publish it in the Proceedings is a matter of policy. It is interesting and provocative, but it is doubtful if it represents the best strategy.

Admiral Conolly concurs with these comments.

Best to you! Your friend Libby gave a splendid talk today and everyone enjoyed it.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral H. D. Felt, USN,
Office of the CNO (Op-30),
Room 4E566 Pentagon,
Washington 25, D. C.

14 November 1952

TO ADM KINKAID.

I have your letter of November 4th and I am hastening to reply to it. I am sending you now, under separate cover, a copy of the Battle of Savo Island. I can do this because you are on active duty. Were you retired I would not be able to do so since it is contrary to our instructions concerning classified matter. In fact, we had to recall the copies of the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway which Admiral Spruance had taken with him when he retired from the War College and the Navy.

Since the Battle for Leyte Gulf has not been published and since no release will be given on that Volume until this has been done, I cannot say when it will be available.

I certainly appreciate your friendly remarks concerning the War College and I appreciate also your forwarding of Dr. Wriston's comments. He is a fine man.

I have tried hard ever since I have been here to make the War College a vital, living thing and I am doing my utmost to insure that the graduates of the War College contribute their full share to the success of the Navy. That I am having some success in this line is apparent since I am receiving numerous letters which so indicate. It is indeed gratifying!

I appreciate also your comments on the War College Review. I have felt that retired officers, and certainly the senior retired officers, should be kept alert to the present day concepts of world thought. It is for that reason that I have placed senior retired flag officers on the mailing lists for the Review, although in doing so I am perhaps

stretching a point since "restricted" is a form of classification.

I hope that you finish your book. I have no doubt that it will be extremely interesting. I know of nothing more tedious than writing a book, but Bates says that at the same time it is, "an exhilarating experience."

With best regards, I am,

Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN(Ret),
2134 R Street, N.W.,
Washington 8, D.C.